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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

CINDY DUBOIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GRAND CENTRAL d/b/a
FRED MEYER,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal No. 920649-CA
(Oral Argument
Priority No. 16)

* * * * * * * *

I.
JURISDICTION

The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County is Article VIII,
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22 (3) (j) (1988); and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court by order
dated September 30, 1992.
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II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION?

This

is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant v. Park
City. 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).

B.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE
GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER?

This is a question

of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant. supra.

C.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER?
question of law reviewed for correctness.

This is a

Marchant, supra.

D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR
SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED
MEYER?

This is a question of law reviewed for correctness.

Marchant, supra.
2

III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES

There

are

no

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely
determinative of the outcome of this case.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition
in District Court.
On January

2, 1991 Cindy Dubois, a seventeen year

employee of Fred Meyer, purchased a computer from Fred Meyer
utilizing certain employee discounts and at a price she believed
to be the correct price. (R. at 140-143).

She was terminated

without prior notice by Fred Meyer on January 4, 1991 as a result
of that purchase. Ms. Dubois was informed that she was terminated
by Fred Meyer for dishonesty and for taking an unauthorized
discount.
Ms. Dubois, the Plaintiff in this case, instituted this
action to recover damages for wrongful termination, breach of the
employment agreement, intentional infliction of emotional distress

3

and slander relating to her termination as an employee on January
4, 1991.
Fred Meyer answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for the difference in purchase price of the computer.
counter-claim is not in dispute.

The

The parties conducted discovery

by way of Ms. Dubois talcing the depositions of several key Fred
Meyer employees.

Fred Meyer took the deposition of Ms. Dubois.

Fred Meyer then filed the motion for Summary Judgment
which was responded to by Ms. Dubois.

Ms. Dubois also filed a

motion to amend her complaint which was granted and resulted in the
Plaintiff's first amended complaint.

This is the complaint that

was dismissed in total pursuant to Fred Meyer's motion.
At the hearing on the motion for Summary Judgment, no
transcript was made, but the Court made oral findings, some of
which are incorporated in the Court's Order and granted the Summary
Judgment filed by Fred Meyer.
Appeal on July 8, 1992.

Ms. Dubois filed her Notice of

There has been no cross-appeal filed in

the action.

B. Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff Cindy Dubois had been an employee of Grand
Central Corporation, d/b/a Fred Meyer for approximately seventeen
years when the operative facts concerning this case occurred.
During Ms. Dubois's seventeen years of employment, she
served as a manager and assistant manager of the photo-electronics
4

department, as a sales clerk, as a cashier and organized and
conducted training for photo-electronics personnel of Fred Meyer.
(R. at 214-222).
While employed as a sales clerk for Fred Meyer, Ms.
Dubois had become aware of a Leading Technology computer, Model
No. 6800SX, which had a sale price on the Fred Meyer computer
pricing system of $999.97.

She was interested in purchasing the

computer for that price (R. at 222-239)
Fred Meyer has as it's principal source of information
regarding prices and goods, a computer pricing system referred as
the CEM system (R. at 141).

This system is the corporate wide

system Fred Meyer uses to provide an immediate price reference for
employees regarding any and all goods within the corporate system.
It goes without saying that the ability to know up to date prices
on an immediate, on-going basis is critical for a retail store such
as those run by Fred Meyer.
On December 31, 1990, Ms. Dubois telephoned Mr. Gary
Jones, a buyer employed by Fred Meyer regarding the price of the
computer. Mr. Jones was located in the Portland, Oregon office of
Fred Meyer.

Ms. Dubois explained to Mr. Jones that she had a

question about whether or not the price she had seen on the CEM
system for the Leading Technology 680OSX computer was correct and
was calling to verify that price.

Ms. Dubois had previously been

trained to know that questions concerning Fred Meyer product prices
would be resolved immediately in the CEM pricing system. (R. at
140-144).
5

Mr. Jones checked the price and indicated to Ms. Dubois
that it appeared that the price was mistaken, but stated to her
that he would investigate the situation and immediately fix it if
it was not correct. (R. at 141,229-230, 232).
At all relevant times, Ms. Dubois had been informed that
the prices referenced on the CEM were the company's authorized
prices and could be relied upon by employees for the purposes of
selling and purchasing goods from Fred Meyer. (R. at 141).
Ms. Dubois did not work on January 1, 1991. As soon as
she came into work on January 2, 1991, Ms. Dubois checked the price
of the 6800SX Leading Technology computer in the CEM pricing system
and found the same price as previously of $999.97. (R. at 141-144).
Mr. Jones made no contact with Ms. Dubois at any time to
indicate that he had verified the correct price of the computer
other

than

as

stated

in

his

conversation. (R. at 247-250).

December

31,

1990

telephone

In the evening of January 2, 1991,

after she was done working for the day, Ms. Dubois purchased the
computer and took it home. (R. at 141-144)." "
Under no circumstance did Ms. Dubois seek to hide the
purchase of the computer system from Fred Meyer, but purchased the
computer openly and directly, through a well known work associate
and paid by her own personal check. (R. at 232-238).
Ms. Dubois did not work on January 3, 1991.

On January

4, 1991, Ms. Dubois came to work and received a phone call from
Mr. Cox, an associate at another local Fred Meyer store, who

6

informed her that she was going to be forced to quit because of
her purchase of the computer (R. at 140-144).
Ms. Dubois then immediately obtained from the CEM System
the document which is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit
1 (R. at 107) which indicated the same $999.97 price for the
computer as previously referenced in the CEM on January 2, 1991,
when she purchased the computer.

As noted on Exhibit 1 to the

Amended Complaint (R. at 107) the price is listed at $999.97, two
days after Ms. Dubois purchased the computer.
Shortly thereafter, on the morning of January 4, 1991,
Ms. Dubois was called to the security offices of the Bountiful Fred
Meyer store and informed she was being fired because she took the
computer out of the store allegedly knowing that the price was
wrong thus giving Fred Meyer grounds to fire her. (R. at 243-244)
Ms. Dubois was aware of the existence of the Fred Meyer
policy in effect, Exhibit 2 to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
(R. at 108) which only permits immediate termination of employees
without

prior

warning

for

acts

such

as

taking

unauthorized

discounts and for dishonesty and those others enumerated on the
Fred Meyer policy. (R. at 108).

At no time until after this

litigation was filed, was Ms. Dubois informed that she was being
terminated for failing to follow a supervisor's directions. (R. at
143-144).
Never at any time was any documentation produced or
provided to Ms. Dubois prior to her termination to show the price
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of the computer was in fact $1,999.97 as claimed by Fred Meyer.
(R. at 144).
The Fred Meyer employee who sold the computer to Ms.
Dubois was never aware of two Leading Technology computers having
the same model number with different prices. (R. at 150).

Fred

Meyer alleged the existence of a "shell" Leading Technology 6800SX
Computer, that cost the $997.97, while the one Ms. Dubois bought
allegedly cost $1997.97. (R. at 199). This "shell theory" is the
entire basis for the termination justification by Fred Meyer.
Disputed

and

contradictory

testimony

exists

in the

depositions of Fred Meyer employees Gary Jones and Dennis Robson
(R. at 181-189, 168-171) on the issue of what was actually stated
to Ms. Dubois regarding the computer and also the information that
Mr. Jones was to provide to Ms. Dubois regarding the corrected
price. (R. at 168-171, 181-190).
In fact, Mr. Jones sent by normal first class mail from
Portland, Oregon a notice to the Bountiful, Utah, store which
arrived in the store the day after Ms. Dubois was terminated, (5
days after her telephone call to Mr. Jones), stating that the price
of the computer was $1999.97. (R. at 247-250). The common practice
(and the logical one regarding a potential sale of a large priced
item) would have been to update the price instantaneously on the
CEM System or provide the information by FAX or telephone to Ms.
Dubois.
As set forth in the Affidavit of Ms. Dubois (R. at 140144), and in the deposition of Jan Williams (R. at 156-157) other
8

Fred Meyer employees had been discussing the fact that she would
be forced to leave Fred Meyer as a result of this computer issue
prior to her even knowing there was a problem.
As set forth in the deposition transcripts (R. at 146190) in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion for Summary Judgment,
there are multiple discrepancies in the testimonies of the various
Fred Meyer employees concerning who knew about the price problem,
what the actual price of the computer was, and when the Fred Meyer
employees became aware of this "shell theory", concerning the other
computer price for $999.97. All such testimony except that of Mr.
Jones is based upon inadmissible hearsay.
As set forth in the Plaintiff's

statement disputed

statement of facts section, (R. at 117-128), the Fred Meyer
employees had multiple problems with the representations made in
their depositions concerning the "investigation" they conducted.
Mr. Jones testified that he did in fact check the price
and stated that it was wrong. However, he failed to notify anyone,
including Ms. Dubois, by way of documentation or correction in the
pricing system in the Bountiful, Utah store until that store
received the document he sent from Portland, Oregon, which arrived
in Bountiful, Utah on January 5, 1991, the day after Ms. Dubois was
terminated.
The remaining Fred Meyer employees who participated in
the alleged investigation of the facts and termination of Ms.
Dubois testified unanimously that they did not check the computer
price themselves but relied solely on the representation of Mr.
9

Jones to some of them that the price was incorrect. (R. at 146190).

Such employees actions were reliance upon what would be in

court inadmissable hearsay evidence.

V.
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

A.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION?
It is Ms. Dubois' position that while she was generally
an employee-at-will with Fred Meyer, the terms of the employmentat-will agreement were modified by the terms of the Fred Meyer
employee

termination

policy

which

constituted

terms

employment contract between Ms. Dubois and Fred Meyer.

of

an

(R. at

108).
This legal position is supported by the case law of
Berube v. Fashion Centre, LTD., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

It is

also admitted by the Defendant. (R. at 74).
Fred Meyer's only rights to terminate Ms. Dubois without
prior notice were under the terms of the employment agreement,
Exhibit 2 to the Amended Complaint

(R. at 108). The existence and

use of the Fred Meyer policy as it's basis for termination, permits
a challenge by Ms. Dubois to the grounds set forth by Fred Meyer
for her termination.

The Court granted Fred Meyer's Motion for

Summary Judgment solely on the grounds that if there was no
10

pretextual reason for Ms. Dubois' termination, that under the
Russell v. Oaden Union Rv. & Depot, Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952)
case, a Utah court has no authority to question the reasonableness
of the termination based upon Fred Meyer's review of the facts in
reaching it's termination conclusion.
Such an outrageous position totally precludes an employee
from

having

the

right

of

judicial

review

of

an

employer's

termination grounds under an employee agreement such as existed in
this

case.

The

Russell,

supra

case

does

not

support

the

proposition as alleged by Fred Meyer.
Ms.

Dubois

set

forth

sufficient

facts

from

the

depositions of the various Fred Meyer employees, and from her own
affidavit,

to

establish

multiple

material

questions

of

fact

sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when such facts
were construed in her favor as must be done in a summary judgment
motion against her.

Such facts clearly show, when so construed,

that the Fred Meyer employees' decision to terminate Ms. Dubois was
based

solely

on

the

hearsay

received

from

Mr.

Gary

Jones.

Thereafter, the Fred Meyer employees who heard the statements of
Mr. Jones made the decision to terminate based upon his information
without performing any independent review and without verifying the
existence or substance of the pricing information and/or error
claimed by Ms. Dubois.

How can a review be reasonable without

hearing the other side of the story and investigating it?
the position

of Ms. Dubois

that

this was

both

It is

a factually

inaccurate investigation and was conducted in a reckless manner;
11

that it did not support termination of Ms. Dubois on the stated
grounds of dishonesty and for taking an unauthorized discount. The
grounds used by Fred Meyer for Ms. Dubois' termination constitute
severe employee black marks on the record of a faithful seventeen
year employee and substantially impairs her ability to be employed
in the future. Such grounds constituted a breach by Fred Meyer of
the employment agreement and wrongful termination of Ms. Dubois

B.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE
GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER?
The Trial Court did not address in oral argument or in
any specific findings other than set forth in the Order it's
grounds

for dismissal

of Ms. Dubois' claim

infliction of emotional distress.

for

intentional

The only source of information

upon which this Court can rely in concluding what the Trial Court
was thinking is a review of the various Memoranda in support of
and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

It can be

perhaps supposed that the Trial Court, in making the finding that
there was no evidence presented of a pretextual termination,
therefore believed that the absence of a pretextual termination
constituted the absence of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

This is not stated in the Court's ruling nor on any

record and is mere guess work because the Court failed to set forth
in detail the grounds for such finding.
12

Ms. Dubois asserts that this failure to specifically
identify the basis for it's finding was error. The cases cited by
Ms. Dubois in her Reply Memorandum provide ample support for the
proposition that a claim of intentionally inflicted emotional
distress is not one appropriate for Summary Judgment.
In the extant case, if the facts were accepted as true
as set forth by Ms. Dubois in her pleadings, in the depositions
cited and in her affidavit, Fred Meyer made a decision to terminate
her based upon a reckless, if not intentional failure to adequately
investigate the circumstances surrounding her purchase of the
computer, and the resultant communications of the decision to
terminate

her

to

other

constitutes emotional

employees.

Such

abuse to her after

reckless

action,

seventeen years of

faithful service and is at least arguably an intentional (and/or
reckless)

infliction

of

emotional

abuse

which

justifies

compensation, or at the very least a review by an impartial finder
of fact.

C.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER?
It is the position of Ms. Dubois that while Utah courts
have indicated there is not an implied covenant of faith and faith
dealing regarding an employee at-will in Utah, under the cases of
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah 1991) and
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Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992), the
Supreme Court did not specifically reject an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts which modify
the employment-at-will relationship.
In this case, Ms. Dubois did have employment agreement
with Fred Meyer. Fred Meyer could not terminate her without prior
notice except for the occurrence of certain circumstances.

Fred

Meyer did terminate Ms. Dubois without prior notice and alleged to
do

so based

circumstances.
challenge

upon

the

occurrence

of

some

of

those

certain

Ms. Dubois clearly should have the right to

whether

the

allegations

made

by

Fred

Meyer

to

substantiate it's immediate termination action were made in good
faith, were investigated in good faith and in fact were accurate.
The Trial Court's decision has precluded this review.

Ms. Dubois

had an employment agreement and should be entitled to require good
faith and fair dealing regarding it's application.

D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR

SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED
MEYER?
As the case of Ms. Dubois' claim regarding intentional
infliction of emotional abuse, the Court dismissed Ms. Dubois'
claim for slander without any reference in argument or written
finding, except the unsupported statement in the Order, which
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referenced the briefs of Fred Meyer as setting forth the grounds
dismissal of this particular claim.
As

set
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evidence, the decision to terminate M s .

Dubois baseri upon controverted "facts" assembled by Fred Meyer to
allege the existence of a "reasonable" investigation
proving,

t~_ alleged

by M s . Dubois,
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the total

precludes

failure

of

u i 1 11

justification by Fred Meyer to terminate her without prior notice.
Such evidence should preclude a summary judgment motion and was set
forth in the affidavit of Ms. Dubois and deposition testimony
submitted in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion. The District Court
has totally precluded an employee from any opportunity to clear her
name in front of a trier of fact and has given an employer the
present right under Utah Law to make any statement it chooses
concerning an employee, to allege a "reasonable investigation" of
the facts, to have a conditional privilege to tell everyone in the
organization the problem from the employer's point of view, to not
permit evidence on the issue of malice, and then have given the
employer immunity from litigation challenging the "reasonableness",
"truthfulness", and legal right of the employer to make such
statements.
Under this case, Utah employers have been granted the
ability and legal right to make whatever false, distorted or
unsupported statement they desire to justify their termination of
an employee and the Utah courts will not permit an employee the
right to challenge the underlying facts in court.
error and must be rectified.
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This is clear

VI.
ZVPPFT.T.ZXMT'S

ARGUMENTS

A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR
BREACH 0 1 ' THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
The basic premise
that

it' iit. il

be denied ,

r

Il , 'liONGFUL •TERMINATION.
Motion of Summary Judgment is

•

issue ul material fact, which

dence present
resolved

,. .

moving party, will entitle tna- non-moving party r
a mat ter of 3 a w\

See Beehive Brick Co. u

P.2d 827 (Utah Ct

"'

;t

me

- -he non-

~ decision as

Robinson Brick Co

»

App, 1989); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d

i

(Utah 1982).
• In I he ,:.d!bf, ml; jy[Quritain states Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, 681 P. 2d 1258 (Utah 1984), the Court indicated that
findings were not necessary to support :i t:s motion for

summary

judgment but: where findings are made and their content evidences
material issues ••-

summary judgment is precluded.

extant case
party, which are
(R. at 312-31'

at °"!^-314
for

the
j

material issues of fact that are controverted.
rh.i- ;s error and should be reversed.

Court found Fred Meyer

termination decision.

whe
party.

;.

Thi^

c

'

substantial basis
findinc

f fact
oving

This is error

Material questions of fact exist regarding each addressed
issue, which for some reason the Trial Court resolved in favor of
the moving party, rather than the non-moving party. Also questions
of law arose which the Trial Court decided in direct opposition to
the current law in existence in the State of Utah.
The key case Fred Meyer cited in it's Motion for Summary
Judgment to support its premise for termination of Ms. Dubois is
Russell v. Oaden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 247 P.2d 1957 (Utah 1952).
The

Russell,

particular instance.

supra

Application

is

inapplicable

in

this

In that case, both sides had an opportunity

to have their facts reviewed.
case.

case

of

the

That did not happen in the extant
Russell

case,

the

Trial

Court's

conclusion from that case and the argument of Fred Meyer in it's
Memoranda (R. at 202-204) would place an employee in Utah who
operated under an employment agreement such as the one in this case
(R. at 108), in a position where such employee has no right to
challenge in court a decision to terminate under a stated policy,
if

the

employer

(without

input

from

the

employee)

presents

affidavits, depositions, or some other alleged evidence whereby the
employer's counsel can argue that the employer made some kind of
"reasonable investigation" of the circumstances.
is a

If this in fact

tenant of Utah law, it is not set forth in any clearly

distinguishable manner and totally denies an employee their rights
of due process to challenge the conclusions or the underlying
rationale of any such termination decision.
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In this instance, M s . Dubois's A m e n d e d Complaint included
a complaint for wrongful termination and b r e a c h of

employment

agreemen t
entitled
actions

©
:

nave

ci

Mi

>: ract

employer

were

relating t o t h e decision
agreement.

nan*

determination

reasonable,

accurate

the
reckless

terminate based

t

O t h e r w i s e , t h e stated premises under w h i c h termination

i

"The employer can unilaterally decide if t h e e m p l o y e e
has breached any of t h e terms hereof and no court challenge t o that
decision is permitted under Utah L a w . "

forced t o accept

unchallenged

employer.

t h e stated

conclusions

and employment agreement w o u l d therefore b e

terminated once .

employer makes

an investigation

Surely

m e a g e r sho*

Investigation, i r reasonable, m u s t b e

based upon facts from both

- ---

dLe

it challenged.
Under Judge Murplr

e \ i il e n L i a r >

He

rationale

II 1/ lr

t; 1: ,1 n C|

I. 11 < •

reasonable can be considered by a co
Dubois' Memorandum
J I')!

IjliJiTIHIdt :,

contested

u u y i m , il1'

factual

Li|,

ie

UK;1!

uestions

< », ~ finding in an

I "111 I

Iritivci,

,
in, Ut.ah,
Opposition

i 1

regarding

diCciS

transcript pages which a r e attached

Motion

Wl

whether

investigation w a s reasonable or simply fabricated
employer's predetermined decision

a a 11,1 a I 1 ) >" w a s

i: Ilk „ .il lit-

i Ati

iustify t h e
<-se al s< » the

Plaintiff's M e m o r a n d u m in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 146190).
Fred Meyer has admitted that an employment contract
existed in this matter.

See page 7 of their Memorandum in support

of their Summary Judgment. (R. at 205). The case law of Berube,
supra, clarifies this issue.

Therefore, the relationship is not

treated as one at-will but one governed by the terms of the
contract. There are clear material and genuine questions of fact
as to whether or not that contract has been breached by virtue of
the alleged conduct of Ms. Dubois and of Fred Meyer.

The very

existence of a document (R. at 145) that existed the day after the
termination of Ms. Dubois should create enough of a material
question of fact to preclude summary judgment if the standard for
such motions is appropriately applied.

In the Brehany, supra case

at 56, the Court indicated that if there are terms of an employee
policy which limit the employer's right to discharge, then a
Plaintiff has a right to put on evidence that the employer did in
fact breach the terms of the employee policy regarding discharge
and such evidence is primarily a factual issue. The evidence that
is relevant to that termination includes the language of the
policy, the employer's course of conduct and pertinent acts and
representations.

All of these items are facts for a jury to

consider.
The Trial Court clearly ignored the above stated elements
from the Brehany, supra case and such refusal to recognize the
right of the Plaintiff to put on evidence on these issues as to
20

whether

the employment

contract

was breached,

and whether

a

wrongful termination occurred, constitutes clear error that must
lie

ni e « » e i |.\e< III,

\ti i ! hi ! I n

inidiil !

MI

! IMIIHDH^I I

I 11 I I'm

Ii i iI

I'I HI I

I

Iiu

a

t r i a l on the evidence.

I

MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY 31 THE
FORTH II I TEE BRIEF C I: 1 IE IS IE I fEYER.

GROUNDS

3' is clearly a material question of fact whether or not
Fred Meyer made

i

either correct or incorrect information and/or assumptions.

If

those assumptions and information wrong and were recklessly or
i

v

. -;

adequately explore the relevant informatioi

3,

made up

stories as a ] ] eged by Ms. Dubois to support their decision to
ter , ii!iiidf„.e l

( s' :t : l:i as t: iheii: "she J I theory), then a prima facia case

exists based upon :.ht pleadings and affidavits of Ms. Dubois for
the intentional

infliction

uf emot lonnl

standard for summary judgments,
facts construed

< . favor.

been der

I n

assessed . ,

\

<h«tre&fi

Mr dei

I lie

Dubois is entitled tc have the

See Jackson, supra.

Ms. Dubois has
5

,act.

The Trial Court provided no insight into it' s thinking
o n ii i s m i s s MI 111 I 111..- i 11111. ti 1J1

i ,i i • I 11 J I I I I I I I I I I J e r e f t > i i j 1 \ i e c»r i II)" b a s i s

for it's conclusion, for purposes of this appeal, are the arguments

set forth in the Fred Meyer's Memorandum in support of it's support
for Summary Judgment. (R. at 205-206).
Ms. Dubois rebutted those arguments in her Memorandum in
Opposition (R.~at 134), and supporting documentation.
The Utah cases of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah
1961) and Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 698 (Utah 1985) indicate
this case is not a likely one for summary judgment.
If the Trial Court truly construed the facts in favor of
Ms. Dubois, just the existence of a document (R. at 145) supporting
her case, from the records of Fred Meyer, which was never reviewed
by Fred Meyer prior to terminating her even though she asked for
it to be reviewed,

(R. at 141-144, 146-190) constitutes the

necessary arguable element of recklessness or intent to inflict
emotional distress. Ms. Dubois is entitled to this inference and
others as set forth in the record.

The Trial Court erroneously

failed to grant her such inferences.
The evidence

is clear that Dennis Robson, Ms. Dubois'

immediate supervisor in his deposition at page 16 (R. at 188),
admits Fred Meyer made a mistake on pricing the computer that is
at the very heart of this issue.

This admission also justifies a

finding that a question of fact exists over whether the decision
to terminate was done recklessly based on mistaken data or for some
other reason.

Fred Meyer made at least one serious admitted

mistake regarding pricing of the computer. Ms. Dubois has pointed
out multiple other mistakes.

These should be construed in her
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favor, against Fred Meyer in, a motion for summary judgmen*

at

140-190).
The Utah I ( I M

I FMA Acceptance C o . J . Leatherby Ins.,

C o . , 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1972) indicates that in negligence cases
ordinarily questions of far- -re presented that need t o be resolved
by a fact-finder and it
where

.

ien i Jj*-« il drill M iiie mid i sputedl miiid

reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that

sin Ih

appropriate

judgment

In cases

ot

.ntentiona

contested f a c t s , t h e burden
judgmen l sin m hi I n

for summary

•, heavily

laden

with

• meeting t h e standard for summary

I

The investigating

employees

Fred M e y e r

admittedly

never even did their o w n independent investigation into t h e p r i c i n g
problem, except
participate

i u n t , r 1111 11t1 m:

" - * . termination decision.

terminat

-

relied

T h e investigating and

- y u u hearsay.

A s set forth in

"Inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot
ruling on a motion for summary judgment "

considered in

the Haueter r supra case at 2 J .

A l l t h e terminating employees except M r , Jones relied o n
hearsay as their evidence for termination.

H o w could such evidence

s u p p o i l.

The

cannot

in

mi if ni in

I

i

' liiiiiikii v

ludwineril

'

i: i i ] «

s i h o u Il d

be

:i t

Such employees would n o t even b e permitted to testify as

to their grounds f o r termination because they did no independent
investigation except

hearsay.

Clearly, a trier of fact could make the determination
that Fred Meyer's admitted mistake regarding the computer's pricing
and its resulting decision to terminate Ms. Dubois based upon her
reliance upon the Fred Meyer pricing system were an intentional or
reckless acts in light of the Fred Meyer termination policy and
therefore an intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Ms.
Dubois. This is how the factual issues should be resolved. To not
permit a trier of fact to see that evidence was clear error on the
part of the Trial Court and such order must be reversed, with the
issue permitted to go to trial.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER.
Under the most recent case of Heslop v. Bank of Utah,
194 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992) the Supreme Court reiterated that
there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
relating to employment relationships when they are entirely atwill.

The question which has not been answered is whether there

is such a covenant attached to specific employment contracts,
commitments or agreements which alter the traditional at-will
employment contract.

Ms. Dubois claims such a covenant exists.

In Heslop, supra at 24, the Court stated that under the
rationale of the case of Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd. 771 P.2d
1033

(Utah

1989),

an employer may
24

create an

implied-in-fact

contract

for employment

that

takes

the relationship

beyond

employment a t - w i U , by making representations such as those set
f

ti,i

..I

,i„! I111!1,

i Supi eme Liuil Ltiei. tou.JI in

Heslop, supra at 2 4 ttt.it it was reasonable to require an employer
who made such representations as those found
agreemen
promises

:

require such employers to stand by their
made

in that modification

of the employment

at-will

agreement.
The requirement *-~ "~+* 4 ~ r — J faith relating to the
terms of the policy set forth

v\:- matter

create new, widepencle'.'l i" ,

-

parties, which was the Court's concern

-e; lot
cigreea

.

:he

the Brehany, supra and

Heslop, supra cases. What the employment agreement does i s re qui :i ::! i: e
I lid1

t\ i1. 'I.1 " i i IIU.

|.Ft;«.:j t J cd IJ y agreed

employer has an

obligation to act: with good faith and fair dealing towards those
specific elements which
i <* extant matter,
a II

employment

ontract

* admitted

exist

eiar

:, r. ^

-

es

Fred

termination

c-t

Meyer
Amended

Complaint

.<-c :.-

^cu^

^red Meyer's Memorandum

support of it's Motion for Summary Judgment.
"I11"i«

i'
"

i

> i 11" i < .1" H in i b s i. 11 y t 1 \ e Amended

t h e Plaintiff specifically says t h e r e is n o implied

Complaint

covenant

good faith a n d fair dealings i n Utah foi employment: cnnl.r
TIIM

»

*»i •» r . iK'Mif., "etjdl conclusion t h a t m u s t b e corrected.

M a r c h a n t , supra.

T h e Courts of this state n e e d to s p e c i f i c a l l y
25

address whether there is an obligation to act in good faith and
with fair dealing towards those specific agreements which do not
fall within or modify the employment at-will doctrine.
The Brehany, supra case at 55 states:
"Of course the at-will doctrine may be altered by terms
contained in an employment manual...However, in the absence of
express terms limiting the right of an employer to discharge for
any or no reason and in the absence of provisions establishing
procedures by which a discharge should be effectuated, it would be
inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the implied
covenant of good faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the
employers right to discharge."
It is

clear

that

the

Supreme

Court

has

placed

a

limitation on the cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing relating to strictly atwill employment arrangements.

What is not clear, is whether that

extends to employment relationships which are modified by the terms
of an expressed limitation such as in this case.

Where the

employer has a right to terminate without notice only upon the
occurrence of certain specified occurrences, the employee is
entitled to expect that the employer act with good faith and fair
dealing regarding those specific types of permissible termination
triggering acts.
The Trial Court in this case has refused to acknowledge
this exception to prior Utah rulings and such issue needs to be
clarified by reversing the Court's decision and remanding this
matter for trial to determine if Fred Meyer breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding the specific
terms of the employment agreement in effect (R. at 108).
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1)

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S

MOTIOl i i: 0 1 1: SU1 CI IA RY

*

SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED
MEYER.
Again (.lie "I'Lial Co nil; made no specif i. ixnding regarding
its dismissal of the claim of slander except solely upon the stated
basis set forth in t, he argument
Based upon these arguments, a conditional privilege . •. Fred Meyer
was the sole basis for dismissal.
W

•

I)i :i boi IE mi :i s I: g i less tha t :i E • exact J 5 * ha !::: the

Court was thinking in order to make hex appellate argument, the
argument that a conditional privilege should apply
1

Uie Brehany. supra case at; pages

Limited.
::»- issue of

conditional privilege was addressed and founc

apply when the

communications were protected

r

interested persons concerning the reasons for discharge.
In the extant case, Jan Williams who was not a supervisor
of

Ms.

Dubois

til K I P i n ni « 1 1 ii«

iiiilin in Ills 11 iniii

Dubois, were advised prior

11 1

ni

u | n e i I i h i 1 ni 111

lis.

':e> termination that she was going

to be disciplined as a result

purchase of the computer.

A n o i InP in w o i " Ik I--"1' 1 1,1 H inprl t iri i" t y

.

the problem

at 1 5 7 ) . As set forth In the deposition of Jan Williams and Dennis
Robson (R

.1! I 56-157, 181-190) and the affidavit

(

-M'I),

140

;

tl'ii: communications from Mr. Robson to Mr, Williams
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to Mr. Cox, and others spread quite rapidly relating to an
allegation that she had a problem regarding the computer.
Brehany, supra at 59 indicates that evidence of malice
is needed to overcome the existence of a conditional privilege.
There, the Court stated that the term "actual malice" is different
from the term "malice" pertaining to common law versus First
Amendment defamation law.
The Court in Brehany, supra at 59 referencing Lind v.
Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983), indicated that the issue of
malice is ordinarily a factual issue.
In the case of Luttrell v. United Telephone System, Inc.
684 P.2d 1292 (Ct. App. Kansas 1984) that Court indicated on page
1294, that the essential elements of a qualifiedly privileged
communication are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement
limited in it's scope to the upholding of such interest and
publication in a proper manner only to proper parties.

The other

side of the coin is that the Plaintiff is required to prove that
the

Defendants

acted

with

knowledge

of

falsity

or

reckless

disregard for the truth before the privilege could be overcome.
In the Haueter, supra case at 235, the Court indicates
that the word "malice" connotes ill-will or an absence of good
faith. Whether ill-will or an absence of good faith exists in this
instance is not, as was focused on by Judge Murphy, merely an issue
of alleging a pretexual termination, but also the ability to put
on evidence that the employer had some other kind of ill-will,
recklessness or intentional disregard toward a party's rights or
28

was acting i~ b?d faith 4^ a-u- termination decision. That
could 1:M

testimony

and i h^
190)

adequately

the -illegal luos against: .

v ". . L

depose,

A substantial quest:-? was never answered,

Meyer employees did fai

\"

* Perry Taylor, Charle
• *jt-=-

i

m

.., , .

the Fred
\

reason
* *

justification did they

have to terminate her without going through the proper notice
requirements set •F«,,»r i i
Withou1

s™^

ndm

egitimate

recklessnes

-

Dubois

-

construec

*

n fn« Mruployiiienl poJ .icy
iactual

justification,

ill-will,

by the Fred Meyer employees to slander MR„

,

-he facts are
-

Ms. Duboi c

as should be done
!

; ~r:^ instance.

^ required t
: -

cases reference above

.. ,r- based upon the

especially for this motion.

She

required to prove that
Fred Meyer

^aii

reckless

. atentionai

-

acted

i

::>ad faith

their investigation and/or termination decision. Such recklessness
and bad faith of then

ferm i iidLii on r a n M

\\v construed from the

following material facts:
I M'-i

Dubois has produced a document proving t' it

price for th1 .".•Viipute. '. !

11 '••

ed arguably was $999.97 two

days after her purchase of the computer.
Dubois has produced eviden.
informed immediately by Mr. Jones it cne
price was incorrect (»•«? at J 41-144).
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3. From Ms. Dubois' experience with the company she
understood

pricing

issues

and

questions

would

be

handled

immediately because of their import. (R. 141-144).
4. The Fred Meyer employees who made the termination
decision failed to and refused to look at Ms. Dubois' evidence at
any time prior to terminating her. (R. at 141-190).
All of the above certainly presents substantial material
questions of fact which should defeat any motion for summary
judgment regarding the issue of slander.

Such questions should

permit Ms. Dubois to put on evidence to see if she can convince a
trier of fact that Fred Meyer had ill-will or bad faith against her
as argued herein. If the allegations of Fred Meyer were wrong, and
had ill-will or a lack of good faith toward Ms. Dubois, (which
could be construed from Fred Meyer's reckless or intentional acts),
the Fred Meyer claims of dishonesty would constitute slander of Ms.
Dubois and any conditional privilege would be negated.
By virtue of the Trial Court's decision that the claims
by Fred Meyer were conditionally privileged, or that Fred Meyer's
attempted "reasonable" investigation could not be challenged in
court, and by virtue of the dismissal of the claim for slander,
Ms. Dubois has no way through the court system to challenge the
representations made to Mr. Williams, Mr. Cox and others that she
was being terminated for dishonesty or any other reason.
black

mark

must

therefore

remain

on

her

record

opportunity for third party review or rebuttal!
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This

without

an

What the Trial Court has done Is to make a rule that if
an employer slanders an employee, communicates that slander among
*-im|»'»»yee'

i I- i, other

" ' >i HIIIH in fi i"p employees state - ley

received such information while conducting an investigation or nhe
facts

or

were

somehow

m

a

supervisor y

loop,

mv

no

represent at :i on s . ' * P contrary, absence some sort of pretextual
evidence,

can

then

considered

for

determining

both

the

truthfulness and
purposes m
employee.

statements relating

termination of

Ms. Dubois - s ransf- :•• action for slander

<=-

dismissed
oased

solely upon the representations made

.

to the action.

This Is expressly contrary to the substance of Ru"
' r I i vi i Pro i/edui, v te idling

to summary judgments wherein the court

i s to determine

genuine issue of material fact

exists, and :t sue*- c> *
permit the case

^

,

:;e

facts were presented , ;;;1 controverted.
146- I Lit1 i„ , 'I'l.r- ,<

•-i-•
~

•••

.

whet

* <—:

hatevei

i ii/j

iU

J.40-145,

- .*,-;

The Trial Court has effectively created
shield : r an employer

Genuine

impenetrable

!a

- chooses about employees,

p^0yer

can

^ a v e other current

employees testify they investigated the facts and support them,
whether or not they really di d investigate
:i nvestigation

was

reasonable,

01"

i whei"K^

whether

\hey

i imi i in
had

any

responsibility to do so, the employee then can present no evidence
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to the contrary.

Our courts have never been so one-sided.

The

summary judgment decision of the Trial Court must be revered
regarding the dismissal of Ms. Dubois' cause of action for slander.

VII.
CONCLUSION

The Trial Court in this instance construed the facts in
favor of the moving party (Fred Meyer); a violation of the rule
and substance regarding summary judgments.
The Trial Court failed to give the appropriate inferences
to the multiple facts produced in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion
by Ms. Dubois and also construed Utah law in such a manner as to
totally exclude an employee from presenting his or her evidence to
a finder of fact for review even when an employment agreement
exists and when serious questions concerning the actions of one
side to issue have been raised.
The
presented

Trial

to

a

Court

fact

refused

finder

on

to

permit

questions

evidence

to be

regarding

the

reasonableness, allegedly substantial, reckless, truthful and good
or bad faith actions of the employer. All these issues are factual
in nature.

All were alleged and contested in the motion for

summary judgment.
For the same reason, the Trial Court resolved all these
issues in favor of the employer.

Employees in Utah now have

absolutely no rights of due process under this decision.

32

Ms.

Dubois respectfully requests this Court not to make such a sad
condition permanent.
DATED this <2%«U day of

f^kcSL^lc^^

,

199J^.
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